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BOOK REVIEWS

PROPERTY, WEALTH,
DEVELOPMENT.

LAND:

ALLOCATION,

PLANNING

AND

Selected Cases and Other Materials on
the Law of Real Property. An Introduction. By Myres
Smith McDougal* and David Haber.** Charlottesville:
The Michie Casebook Corporation, 1948. Pp. viii, 1213.
$9.50.

"To make a superb inventory of Augean stables is not
to cleanse them." With this thundering denunciation and its
implied fiat to reform, Professor McDougal, in 1942, disposed
of Volume III of American Law Institute's Restatement of
1 Professors
the Law of Property.
McDougal and Haber now
have made an equally superb and more inclusive inventory of
some areas of the stables, and have rearranged the contents.
The authors have collected, edited and organized reported cases, critical writings analyzing legal concepts, and
analyses of data from the social and physical sciences, the
impact of which on the formulation of legal policy the
authors believe should be recognized.2 Each item of material in the book is footnoted with painstaking care, not only
with case citations, but also with carefully selected references to notes, comments and articles representing a distillation of the work and scholarship of others.
The book is divided into three parts. The first section
analyzes and breaks down into their components the concepts which we call property and ownership, indicating how
social controls may be applied to determine what is "property." The second part is devoted to what is designated as
"land (resource) allocation by private volition," giving
examples of classes of claims, the administrative procedures
for establishing and maintaining them, and some possibilities
of their disposition. The third part, about two-thirds of the
book, is dedicated to land planning and development on local,
state, regional and world levels.
A reader's comparison of the second and third parts
* William K. Townsend Professor of Law, Yale University.
** Assistant Professor of Law, Yale University.

1. McDougal, Future InterestsRestated: Tradition Versus Clarification and Reform. 55 HARv. L. REv. 1077, 1115 (1942).
2. For example, see Comment: Cooke, Physical and Functional Relationships,Headwater Contr.ol and Use (1936), reprinted at p. 983, and
citations throughout of numerous non-legal articles on topics usually
classified in the fields of the social and physical sciences.
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of the book reveals the fallacy of the classification of law
into "private" law and "public" law. There is but one system of law as it applies to property. The difference between
private and public law is one of degree. The law presently
imposes fewer or less rigid social controls in some areas of
human conduct than in others. The clamor for more "public"
law is a demand for more or different social controls over
the individual's power to engage in certain conduct, or to
acquire, have and dispose of resources. The cry for a return to "private" law is a demand for less or different social
controls over the individual's power to act, or to acquire,
have or dispose of resources. A regulation of land use by
a zoning law or ordinance (under delegated authority), or
a control of atomic energy becomes as much a part of the
law of property as the regulation of nuisances, or of riparian
rights. The authors' recognition that a system of law cannot be classified into "private" and "public" regulation is a
distinct contribution to the present practicing and teaching
profession.
The same consideration enters the disputes over law
curricula. Too frequently, the question of how law should
be taught is merged with the question what law should be
taught. That law should be taught as a policy science may
be only a fusion of "how" into "what."
While recognizing the fallacy of the classification of
law into public and private the authors have, nevertheless,
contributed to the perpetuation of it. The second part of
their book they designate as "land (resource) allocation by
private volition." The materials they include in the section
indicate that the conflict in the exercise of individual volitions was decided under a system of law. Developments of
controls permitting individual disposition of resources by
means of wills and trusts, which constitute a major part of
present policy problems in property law are minimized, as
are their backgrounds. What was designated as "private"
volition was, in fact, what that system of law permitted one
individual to do. One can only infer that the authors believe and hope to convey the conviction that the individual
"bundle of rights" should be reduced materially. With such
a belief, so stated, I can agree.
It is logically inescapable that the reasoning behind the
second part of the book must be projected into the third
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The earlier chapters of the third section
section.
amplify the areas of confusion created by a system of
law permitting what is considered as too much flexibility
of choice of conduct in the individual. There follow examples of modern subjection or subordination of individual
choice of the person to what is considered the best interests
of the local community. The examples given on local community planning, however, exhibit the same weaknesses in
allowing local community "volition" as were admirably shown
in permitting private individual "volition." If the exercise
of individual "volition" is not in harmony with the best
interests of the local community, then the exercise of local
community "volition" may not be in harmony with the best
interests of the state. The exercise of state "volition" may
not be, and frequently is not, in the best interests of the
region. The exercise of a regional "volition," either under
state compacts or by Congressional authority (which may
not be real regional volition).may not be in the best interest
of the nation.
These things, however, are only matters of internal
(local) concern. Perhaps, with adequate training in policy
science in the law, these problems can and will be solved, on
a national basis. The most important problem remains. If
these problems are solved on a national basis, is that solution
consonant with the best interests of the citizens of international regions or of the entire world? That which may be
the best allocation for the interests of those who live in the
United States of America may be a quite sdlfish allocation
if one considers the presently hopeless outlook of the millions
of Asia. In any truly comprehensive planning, for example,
the effect of immigration laws on resource allocation must
be re-examined as those laws amount to restrictive covenants
on a world scale. Good planning will require some rather
restrictive control of births to avoid an imbalance in allocation of resources among peoples. Even in One World, an
uncontrolled human production might be ultimately disastrous, because the resources to be allocated are not infinite.
With consummate skill and subtle organization, the authors
point out the existence of these ultimate problems, even
though not attempting a complete inventory of them.
Considering the book as a proposed introduction for untrained students to secure some understanding of and an
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ability to evaluate the concepts of a system of law as it
applies to property, it should lead them to become not only
legal statesmen but legal craftsmen as well. To be effective
lawyers they should understand the relationship of presently
accepted concepts with the facts out of which they arose,
before deciding whether those concepts are now applicable,
or should be revised or discarded. Many, if not most, of
those who will graduate from our law schools will begin the
practice of their profession in smaller county seat communities. Of these, some will become judges of the highest judicial tribunals of their states, or even justices of the Supreme
Court; some will achieve high posts in the executive and
legislative branches of the state and federal governments;
some may be representatives deciding policy on an international level; most of them will continue in the application
of our system of law, whatever it may be, where they started.
All will have important functions to perform.
Whether the function be to change, amplify or administer the system of law, an understanding of both the universals and the particulars of that system might be helpful.
The authors have produced a great critical analysis of a
system of law to be used by students who have little comprehension of the particulars of that which is being analyzed.
These students might even assume that such an understanding was neither necessary nor desirable. May one reasonably
suggest that lawyers would be better equipped in the future
to supervise change if they understood that which their new
policies were replacing, if for no other reason than to avoid
past error?
The book is one of the most stimulating works of its
kind which has been published. It could be studied with
profit by every graduate law student, practicing lawyer,
judge, legislator with law training, and by every law
teacher. As either an introduction to the study of property
law, or as an introduction to legal theory and method, I am
not yet convinced of its ultimate values.
Even Augean stable boys might profit by a better understanding of the stable's contents.
Leon H. Wallacet
t Professor of Law, Indiana University.

